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THE ECONOMICS OF THE JOINT
ANTITRUST DISSENTS OF JUSTICES
HARLAN AND STEWART
Ray 0. Werner*
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeai to the brooding spirit
of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision
may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes
the court to have been betrayed. 1
This oft-quoted observation of Chief Justice Hughes focuses on the
invaluable function generally performed by the dissenting opinion.
Certainly it indicates why special attention to dissents of United States
Supreme Court justices is not only justified but often compelled. Not
only can dissenting opinions reveal the not-so-still, not-so-small voice
of conscience "pitched to a key that will carry through the years, ' 2
but they also can point to a rationale that may eventually direct the
Court's deliberations.
In the field of antitrust law, Justices John M. Harlan and Potter
Stewart together were active dissenters; since the death of Justice
Harlan in 1972, however, Justice Stewart has lacked vigorous rein-
forcement from a dynamic dissenting colleague. From the time of Jus-
tice Stewart's appointment to the Court in 1958, the two joined in
frequent dissents to decisions involving regulation of the competitive
contours of our economic society. Even if their strong dissents are not
soon embraced by other Justices, they inevitably compelled the ma-
jority to give increased attention both to the consequences and to the
economic facts and theories underlying the logic of the Court's deci-
sions. This article is a study of the economic rationale which underlies
the antitrust dissents of Justices Harlan and Stewart. The study reveals
the evolution of a definite minority economic rationale for govern-
mental regulation of business.
* Professor of Economics, The Colorado College; A.B., Hastings College, 1942;
Ph.D., Nebraska, 1960; Fellow in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, 1966-67.
1. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
2. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 14 YALE REVIEw 699 (1925).
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I. ECONOMIC CRITERIA OF ANALYSIS
Procedural questions, while important, were not the major element
in the dissents of Justices Harlan and Stewart. Central to their joint
dissents were the much more fundamental issues of the structure, the
conduct, and the performance of industry. Early in their respective
careers, each realized that the contours of the nation's economic
system were being altered by the decisions of the Court.3 They were
willing to try their hands at creating and modifying that system.
Although the interrelations between industry structure, conduct,
and performance are important, these three concepts may be sepa-
rated for analytical purposes.4 Economists have long debated the exact
meaning to be assigned to each of these concepts. Certain basic supply
and demand conditions constitute the parameters of the system. Thus,
supply factors such as raw materials, technology, product characteris-
tics (durability, value, and weight), business attitudes, and unioniza-
tion and demand factors such as price elasticity, rate of growth, mar-
keting type, purchase method, and seasonal and cyclical variables are
crucial.5 Arising from these basic conditions, the market structure
embraces the number of sellers and buyers, barriers to entry, product
differentiation, cost structures, vertical integration, and "conglomer-
ateness. ' '6 Conduct is revealed in pricing behavior, product strategy,
3. This early recognition is best revealed in the dissents examined later in this
paper. Early recognition by Justice Harlan is revealed in McKesson & Robbins, dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 13 infra; that of Justice Stewart is evident in Alcoa,
discussed in text accompanying note 30 infra.
4. The content of each of the concepts examined at length here is based on the brief
but exceptionally lucid exposition of F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3-7 (1970). In afine review of theories of workable competi-
tion, Sosnick delineates the different market characteristics thus:
"Structure" refers to characteristics which constitute a market's patterns, sta-
tus, composition. "Conduct" refers to characteristics which are enterprises' actions,
dealing, or tactics. "Performance" refers to dimensions which represent the realiza-
tion of normatively significant "economic" results. Conduct and performance to-
gether are sometimes called "behavior."
Sosnick, A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition, 72 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON.
380, 386 (1958) (emphasis added). See also E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND
THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM ch. 18 (1957); H. LIEBHAFSKY, AMERICAN GOvERNMENT AND
BUSINESS 236-62 (1971); P. ASCH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA
118-24 (1970), for further ramifications of the controversy. These works contain exten-
sive citations to related studies in the professional literature.
5. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1970).
6. Id. at 5.
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research and innovation, advertising, and legal tactics.7 Performance
attributes include productive and allocative efficiency, progress, full
employment, and equity,8 although efficiency probably is foremost
when performance criteria are applied.
Interrelationships and overlaps are likely in both theoretical discus-
sions and applications of these concepts. Reconciliation attempts
abound.9 Moreover, even if a performance criterion such as "pro-
gress" is adopted, its application remains as subjective as the criterion
is vague. Yet to indicate all the problems economic theoreticians face
resolves nothing-the fact remains that lawyers and judges, when
confronted by an actual case, must adopt, either explicitly or implic-
itly, some criteria by which to assess the economic conflict facing
them.' 0
In the final analysis, if the performance of an industry be adjudged
efficient, adherents of a performance criterion would ask no more.
They reason that if the economic results are desirable, then the
methods of conduct or the structure of the industry are not relevant.
Proponents of the conduct criterion of industry evaluation contend
that the economic action and tactics employed by business are either
defensible or indefensible-price fixing agreements, for example, are
likely to be deemed indefensible under this criterion. However, con-
duct adherents often advance the corollary argument that if the con-
duct is dubious, the performance is doubtful. Finally, the structuralists
look at the organization of industry. If they find a competitive market
structure, they assume that the results will be favorable; if monopoly
exists, a misallocation of resources and inefficiency in production are
assumed to result. Although structuralists assume a tie between in-
dustry structure and performance, the focus of their regulatory or
corrective measures is on structure. If a noncompetitive structure ex-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. A classic attempt at reconciliation is Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly
Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 1265 (1949).
10. Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition,
40 AM. EcoN. REv. 349, 361 (1950), presents an argument for what almost constitutes
another criterion, although not a frequently cited one. Markham, in the most pragmatic
of all approaches, states:
An industry may be judged to be workably competitive when, after the structural
characteristics of its market and the dynamic forces that shaped them have been
thoroughly examined, there is not clearly indicated change that can be effected
through public policy measure that would result in greater social gains than social
losses.
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ists, they would attempt to remedy the situation without analysis of
the performance of the industry. However, most conduct and struc-
ture advocates ultimately agree that if their focal criteria are not satis-
fied, the resulting performance is suspect." Nevertheless, structure
and conduct may be satisfactory and yet, because of unacceptable use
of managerial discretion or social irresponsibility, the enterprise may
perform unsatisfactorily. 12 It must be remembered that these criteria
overlap; they are not divisions into which business characteristics can
be neatly compartmentalized. However, as analytical concepts, they
are useful in understanding the rationale that governs decisions in
specific cases.
A chronological analysis of the dissents of Justices Harlan and
Stewart reveals an evolving pattern of conscious recognition of the
three dimensions of market characteristics. The two justices were not
merely consummate pragmatists meeting each case without a devel-
oped and consistent rationale. Although individual cases do demon-
strate some of the artificiality that characterizes the trichotomous clas-
sification economists employ, a study of the dissents reveals a willing-
ness of Justices Harlan and Stewart to emphasize the performance of
an industry, while not ignoring conduct or structural variables.
II. PIONEERING DISSENTS OF JUSTICE HARLAN
In the brief years between Justice Harlan's appointment to the
Court in 1955 and the appointment of Justice Stewart in 1958, Jus-
tice Harlan participated in a number of cases presaging the eventual
position the two would take. In United States v. McKesson & Robbins 3
Justice Harlan launched the first in his long series of antitrust dis-
sents. McKesson & Robbins, the largest drug wholesaler in the nation,
sold its brand-name drugs to both retailers and independent whole-
salers. The company adopted a resale price maintenance policy in its
dealings with the independent wholesalers, believing that such a policy
was immune from attack under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act'4
11. Sosnick, supra note 4, at 386.
12. Id. at 381.
13. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
14. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e] very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ... 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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by provisions of the Miller-Tydings Act 5 and the McGuire-Keogh
Act'6 which legalized certain price-fixing arrangements. The majority,
speaking through Justice Warren, did not agree, holding that Mc-
Kesson & Robbins' resale price maintenance policy was not exempt
from the prohibition of the Sherman Act. The Court concluded that a
manufacturer whose direct sales to retail outlets competed with inde-
pendent wholesalers to whom it also sold under resale price mainte-
nance agreements was engaged in illegal price-fixing.' 7
Quoting from United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,18 the
Court noted: 19
A distributor of a trade-marked article may not lawfully limit by
agreement, express or implied, the price at which or the persons to
whom its purchaser may resell, except as the seller moves along the
route which is marked by the Miller-Tydings Act.
Having found as a matter of fact that McKesson & Robbins, at least
to the extent of its wholesale activities, was in direct horizontal com-
petition with the independent wholesalers to whom it sold, the Court's
holding was compelled by its reliance upon the proviso of the Miller-
Tydings Act. The Court stated:2 0
[E] xemptions of certain resale price maintenance contracts from the
prohibition of the antitrust laws "shall not make lawful any contract or
agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of min-
imum tesale prices or on any commodity herein involved between
. . . wholesalers . . . or corporations incompetition with each other."
15. Section 1 of the Miller-Tydings Act, an amendment to the Sherman Act, prov-
ides that in those states permitting such contracts to be made, contracts between manu-
facturers and retailers to fix resale prices would not be in violation of the Sherman Act.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
16. Section 2 of the McGuire-Keogh Act amended section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and extended the exemption of resale price maintenance contracts to
nonsigners of such contracts in states legalizing such contracts, permitting recalcitrant
nonsigning retailers to be proceeded against by manufacturers who utilize resale price
maintenance contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 45A (1970). The nonsigners provision was passed
by Congress in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Cal-
vert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), which held that the Miller-Tydings Act did
not extend the exemption from the Sherman Act to parties who had not signed a resale
price maintenance contract with the producer.
17. 351 U.S. at 313. McKesson & Robbins used two techniques in dealing directly
with retailers: direct sales to important retailers from its manufacturing operations, and
sales to other retailers through its own wholesale divisions.
18. 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944).
19. 351U.S. at 310.
20. Id.at3ll.
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The majority's decision ultimately turned upon its assessment of the
structure of industry and the firm. The majority reasoned that Con-
gress plainly intended to prohibit such conduct as effectuates
" 'horizontal' price fixing by those in competition with each other at
the same functional level."2 ' Perceiving no ambiguity in the language
of the Acts, the majority, after noting that statutory limitations cir-
cumscribed the Court's analysis, added: "[W] e are bound to construe
them strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of
a free economy." 22
Differing with the majority's conduct orientation and preferring the
performance criterion, Justice Harlan argued at length that the major-
ity's "artificial construction" and lack of sympathy for the congres-
sional acts led it to a position contrary to the policy that Congress had
adopted. In an extensive analysis of the purpose of the fair trade laws
upon which McKesson & Robbins had relied for exemption from the
Sherman Act, Justice Harlan argued: 23
The purpose of the state fair-trade laws is to allow the manufacturer
of a brand-named product to protect the goodwill his name enjoys by
controlling the prices at which his branded products are resold ...
The necessary result-indeed the very object-is to permit the elimi-
nation of price competition in the branded product among those who
sell it. Congress has sanctioned those laws in the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts, considering them not to be offensive to federal anti-
trust policy. Sufficient protection to the public interest was deemed to
be afforded by the competition among different brands, a safeguard
made express by the provision of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire
Acts denying fair-trade contracts exemption from the antitrust laws
unless the fair-traded product is "in free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class." In short, the very purpose of
the Acts is to permit a manufacturer to set the resale price for his own
products while preserving compettion between brands-that is, be-
tween the fair-traded item and similar items produced by other manu-
facturers.
21. Id. at 313, quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
389 (1951). The Court had previously held that price-fixing agreements are illegal per se
without regard to the wisdom or reasonableness of the prices set. See United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
22. 351 U.S. at316.
23. Id. at 317.
560
Vol. 48: 555, 1973
Antitrust Dissents of Justices Harlan and Stewart
He then continued his argument, adding:24
If we accept the legislative judgment implicit in the Acts that resale
price maintenance is necessary and desirable to protect the goodwill
attached to a brand name, there is no meaningful distinction between
the fair-trade contracts of integrated and non-integrated manufac-
turers. Certainly the integrated manufacturer has as strong a claim to
protection of his goodwill as a non-integrated manufacturer, and the
economic effect of the contracts is the same. In both cases price com-
petition in the resale of the branded product is eliminated, and in nei-
ther case does the price fixing extend beyond the manufacturer's own
product. While the Government concedes the right of a non-integrated
manufacturer to eliminate price competition in his products between
wholesalers, it finds a vice not contemplated by the Acts when one of
the "wholesalers" is also the manufacturer, for then the contracts elim-
inate competition between the very parties to the contracts. But, in
either case, all price competition is eliminated, and I am inable to see
what difference it makes between whom the eliminated competition
would have existed had it not been eliminated. The other bases of dis-
tinction suggested by the Government are equally tenuous and reflect a
subtlety of analysis for which there is no support in either the Acts or
their history.
The central element in Justice Harlan's rationale was his conviction
that satisfactory performance of the economy could be preserved ade-
quately by inter-brand competition. Justice Harlan contended that the
conduct which he believed Congress had legitimized-that of resale
price agreements--extended to the elimination of intra-brand compe-
tition of an integrated producer such as McKesson & Robbins. If the
behavior of a manufacturer was consistent with protection of its own
goodwill, Justice Harlan would not restrict the behavior. He appar-
ently believed that the resulting economic performance would be rea-
sonably good, if not salutary, and interpreted congressional intent in
enacting the Miller-Tydings and the McGuire Acts accordingly.
Justice Harlan's second major antitrust dissent prior to Justice
Stewart's membership on the Court, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States,25 involved a tying contract in the form of preferential
routing agreements for agricultural produce. Northern Pacific
24. Id. at 317-18.
25. 365 U.S. 1 (1957). Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker joined in Justice Harlan's
dissent.
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Railway allegedly imposed these agreements upon persons who leased
or purchased from Northern Pacific land which initially had been
donated to the railroad to facilitate its construction.
Resolution of the case, according to Justice Harlan, depended on
whether Northern Pacific maintained a dominant position in the tying
market so that the preferential agreement could be effectively tied to
the land sales or leases. 26 Justice Harlan criticized the majority for
permitting what he "deem [ed] to be a serious abuse of the summary
judgment procedure. '2 7 Faced with "a record barren of facts to sup-
port a finding" 28 that the percentage of land controlled by Northern
Pacific, the uniqueness of its location, or the land's inherent quality
was sufficient to give the railroad dominance in the tying market, Jus-
tice Harlan would have remanded "for a trial and findings on the issue
of 'dominance.' "29 Thus, Justice Harlan rejected the majority's focus
on conduct which led it to hold tying contracts illegal per se. Justice
Harlan's emphasis on the question of "dominance" seemingly was
founded upon a structural evaluation of the relevant market.
III. THE EARLY JOINT DISSENTS:
SEARCH FOR A CRITERION
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,30 the focus of the
Court was clearly upon the structure of the industry. The issue was
whether Alcoa's acquisition of the stock and assets of Rome Cable
Corporation violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribed
stock or asset acquisitions "where in any line of commerce in any sec-
tion of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly. .... -31
26. The essence of the majority's opinion, written by Justice Black, was that
Northern Pacific Railway had imposed "preferential routing" clauses in its leases of
railroad land which its predecessor had been granted by Congress in 1864 and 1870.
These leases, requiring lessees of railroad land to ship via Northern Pacific unless a
competing carrier offered better rates or service, involved a restraint on free competi-
tion and were held to be illegal per se. Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Id.
30. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 of the Clayton Act (the Celler-Kefauver
amendment) provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
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In the dissent authored by Justice Stewart, 32 there was no dispute
with the majority about the facts of the case. Rome's production was
primarily insulated copper cable; Alcoa produced no copper cable but
did produce 32.5% of the bare aluminum conductor market and
11.6% of the insulated conductor market. Rome's share of the insu-
lated aluminum conductor market was 4.7%, of the bare aluminum
conductor market it was 0.3%, and of the combined market it was
1.3% .33 If Rome's share of the bare aluminum conductor market was
combined with Alcoa's share, the impact on Alcoa's market share
would be slight. Similarily, there would not be a significant impact on
the market if Rome's total conductor production (both aluminum and
copper) was combined with Alcoa's total production. If, however,
Rome's total aluminum conductor production was added to Alcoa's
production, Alcoa's dominance of the market would increase sharply.
The district court, holding that bare and insulated aluminum con-
ductor did not constitute a separate line of commerce,34 was unable to
find that Alcoa had violated section 7. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that bare and insulated aluminum conductor did constitute
one line of commerce.35 Although Alcoa's share of the relevant
market rose by only 1.3%, the majority concluded that the acquisi-
tion of Rome, an "aggressive competitor," might result in a substantial
reduction of competition. 36 Thus the merger was deemed a violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id.
32. Along with Justice Harlan, Justice Goldberg joined in the dissent.
33. 377 U.S. at 274. Alcoa produced no copper cable whereas Rome primarily pro-
duced insulated copper cable. Thus, the merger also involved product extension by
Alcoa.
34. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
35. 377 U.S. at 276-77.
36. Id at 280. Emphasizing the language of section 7, "where... the effect'... may
be to substantially lessen competition,' "the court noted that the committee report at the
time of the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act in 1950 focused on the
objective of preventing "accretions of power which 'are individually so minute as to
make it difficult to use the Sherman Act' test against them." Id. In addition, the Court
discussed a standard with some of the characteristics of "perfect competition," noting
that competition is most vital when there are many sellers, none of which has any
significant market share.
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Justice Stewart's dissent argued that the Government had failed to
prove its "line of commerce" claim. Citing the Court's earlier decision
in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,37 he indicated: "A line of com-
merce is an 'area of effective competition,' to be determined in ac-
cordance with the principles laid down in our prior decisions." 38
He continued:39
The Court in that case [Brown Shoe] did not attempt to formulate any
rigid standard for determining submarket boundaries, but indicated
that a broad-ranging pragmatic evaluation of market realities was re-
quired. The Federal trial courts were admonished to examine "such
practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as
a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes and specialized vendors." ... These
"practical indicia" to be considered in determining submarket bounda-
ries express in practical terms the basic economic concept that mar-
kets are to be defined in terms of the close substitutability of either
product (demand) or production facilities (supply), since it is ulti-
mately the degree of substitutability that limits the exercise of market
power, and it is only by delimiting the area of effective competition
that an acqusition's competitive effects can be ascertained.
Having outlined the basis upon which he would proceed, Justice
Stewart applied his theory to the facts, concluding that the district
court was correct in finding that insulated and bare aluminum con-
ductors did not constitute a separate line of commerce. Justice
Stewart determined that all "conductor wire and cable (both bare and
insulated, aluminum and copper)" constituted one line of commerce 40
and that "insulated conductor (both aluminum and copper)" consti-
tuted another line of commerce, noting "that Alcoa's and Rome's
37. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
38. 371 U.S. at 283.
39. Id.
40. Stewart apparently did not accept the majority's conclusion that the cross-
elasticity of demand is so low that copper wire is not within the relevant market-
though he does not provide proof for this position. In response to the majority's conclu-
sion that copper conductors should be excluded from the relevant market because of the
great price disparity between copper and aluminum, Justice Stewart relied upon the
district court's finding that this price difference did not foreclose actual competition and
contended that under the majority's holding "important competitive copper elements
would be improperly and arbitrarily excluded." Id. at 284.
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market shares in these broad product markets were insufficient to
support a finding of requisite anticompetitive effect. '41
Justice Stewart and his fellow dissenters concluded that since the
structure of the industry was competitive, no remedial action was re-
quired to restructure it. Industry structure was the only consideration
necessary; conduct and performance criteria were not applied. Yet is
it not clear that the majority seriously disagreed with the proposition
that structure was a dominant consideration-their reference to many
relatively small sellers is indicative of their concern about structure. If
this be true, then the only disputed issue was a factual one of the rele-
vant market and its related structure.
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,42 the two principal
problems examined were the applicability of section 7 of the Clayton
Act to banking43 and the relation between section 7 and the Bank
Merger Act of 1960.4 4 Speaking for the majority, Justice Brennan
held that section 7 was intended to apply to banking mergers as well
as mergers in other industries and that the Bank Merger Act of 1960
was not intended to immunize mergers approved by the banking agen-
cies from the operation of the federal antitrust laws.45
The lengthy dissent of Justices Harlan and Stewart challenged both
the central propositions of the majority, contending that the holding
of the Court serves "to frustrate the objectives of the Bank Merger Act
[and] finds no justification in either the terms of the 1950 amend-
ment of the Clayton Act or the history of the statute."46 Although the
Bank Merger Act does require that competitive effects be considered
41. Id. at 282-83.
42. 374U.S. 321 (1963).
43. Noting that the Celler-Kefauver amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act
foreclosed the "asset acquisition loophole" to all corporations subject to the jurisdiction
of the FTC (which does not include banks), the Court held that an exchange of stock of
one bank for the assets of another was a stock acquisition under section 7 from which
banks were not excluded. The Court would find an asset acquisition only in those cases
where no exchange or transfer of stock is involved. See 374 U.S. at 346.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970).
45. 374 U.S. at 354. The Court noted that" [a] Ithough the Comptroller was required
to consider the effect upon competition in passing upon appellee's merger application,
he was not required to give this factor any particular weight; he was not even required to
(and did not) hold a hearing before approving the application; and there is no specific
provision for judicial review of his decision." Id. at 351. The Court further noted that
there was no express section 7 exemption for banks in the Bank Merger Act and that
federal banking regulation was neither all-pervasive nor primarily concerned with anti-
trust issues. Id. at 352.
46. Id. at 374.
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prior to merger approval, the dissent proceeded from the premise that
in the field of deposit banking "considerations other than simply the
preservation of competition are relevant. ' 47 The relevant considera-
tions-notably "safety and soundness" of banking practices4 8-were
clearly performance criteria, in sharp contrast to the rationale of
Justice Stewart's dissent in Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, where structural
considerations were predominant. The dissenters largely relied upon
the legislative history of the relevant acts to support their position that
section 7 of the Clayton Act was not intended to apply to the deposit
banking industry. Convinced that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was
intended exclusively to govern the special problem of bank mergers,
they stated:49
For 10 years everyone-the department responsible for antitrust law
enforcement, the banking industry, the Congress, and the bar-pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the 1950 amendment of the Clayton
Act did not affect bank mergers. This assumption provided a major
impetus to the enactment of remedial legislation, and Congress, when
it finally settled on what it thought was the solution to the problem at
hand, emphatically rejected the remedy now brought to life by the
Court.
Granting arguendo that section 7 is inapplicable, the dissenters'
case is persuasive; the legislative history, relating to bank mergers
grounded on an acceptable performance-oriented analysis, does not
support the premise that any structural modification of the banking
industry which might tend to limit competition is prohibited.50 The
relevant bank regulatory agency-the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Federal Reserve
Board- should weigh the "convenience and needs of the community
to be served"5' against the possible anticompetitive effects of the pro-
posed merger and should render its decision accordingly.
Less than one year later the banking industry was again before the
Supreme Court in United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of
47. Id. at 375. The dissenters noted that the congressional purpose was "that effect
on competition was not to be the controlling factor in determining whether to approve a
bank merger, that a merger could be approved as being in the public interest even
though it would cause a substantial lessening of competition." Id. at 382 (emphasis
added).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 384.
50. Id.
51. See note 46 supra.
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Lexington.52 The issue was whether the consolidation of the largest
and the fourth largest of six commercial banks in Fayette County,
Kentucky, violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.53 The two
banks controlled approximately ninety percent of the commercial
banking in the county. In both Lexington and Philadelphia National
Bank, the bank regulatory agencies had found that the mergers would
adversely effect competition among commercial banks in the area.5 4
Nevertheless, in both cases the Comptroller of the Currency had ap-
proved the consolidation under his interpretation of the Bank Merger
Act of 1960. The Philadelphia Court determined that even if valid
under the Bank Merger Act, the merger might be enjoined under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act; in Lexington the question was whether a
similar consolidation would contravene the provisions of the Sherman
Act. The court answered in the affirmative;55 Justice Harlan, with
whom Justice Stewart concurred, again dissented.56
The dissent began by noting that this decision was unnecessary and
indeed pernicious since the Philadelphia decision a year earlier had
provided a rationale for future cases involving bank mergers. 57 Justice
Harlan's argument addressed two major points: did the merger create
a firm that was more than simply a "big" one, and was the motive for
the merger anticompetitive?
52. 376 U.S. 665 (1964). The date of this decision was April 6; Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank was decided June 17, 1963.
53. See note 14 supra. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not ex-
ceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
54. Lexington, 376 U.S. at 665; Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 321.
55. Lexington, 376 U.S. at 666-73. The majority, after deciding that the relevant
market was commercial banking in Fayette County, noted: "[T] he 'image' of 'bigness'
is a powerful attraction to customers, an advantage that increases progressively with
disparity in size; and thus the multiplicity of extra services in the trust field which the
new company could offer tends to foreclose competition there." Id. at 669. The majority
concluded: "We think it clear that the elimination of significant competition between
First National and Security Trust constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in vio-
lation of § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 669-70.
56. See Justice Stewart's dissent, id. at 673. The majority, having decided that
the merger was in violation of section I of the Sherman Act, did not reach the question
of whether section 2 had been violated.
57. Id.
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On the first point Justices Harlan and Stewart admitted that struc-
turally the banking industry in Fayette County would experience the
development of a merged bank with a large dollar volume and a large
percentage of the business in the market,58 but this was considered to
be of limited significance because "the strength of the remaining com-
petition" remained viable and effective. 59 Moreover, the dissenters
concluded that there was "no evidence at all in the record of an anti-
competitive motive behind the consolidation." 60 Based upon these
findings, the dissent felt that the Court misapplied the precedent upon
which it relied. The dissenters repeated the majority's quotation from
United States v. Columbia Steel Co.:6s
In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we do not
think dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we look
rather to the percentage of business controlled, the strength of the
remaining competition, whether the action springs from business re-
quirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable development of
the industry, consumer demands and other characteristics of the
market.
Selectively adopting two of these explicit criteria, the strength of re-
maining competition and the purpose of the business action, Justices
Harlan and Stewart found both the resulting industry structure and
the conduct of the banks above reproach. The dissent strongly criti-
cized the majority for looking solely to market structure and relying
solely upon size---"bigness"-as a criterion for determining that sec-
tion 1 had been violated.6 2
Just over two months after Lexington was decided under the
Sherman Act, another case involving the application of section 7 of
the Clayton Act was decided by the Court. This time, however, it was
not the banking industry but manufacturing that was involved. In
United States v. Continental Can Co.6 3 the Government had attacked
the asset acquisition by Continental Can, the producer of thirty-three
percent of the nation's metal containers and second largest such pro-
ducer in the nation, of Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, the nation's third
58. Id. at 676.
59. Id. at 677.
60. Id. at 678.
61. 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948).
62. 376 U.S. at 678-80.
63. 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (decided June 22). Lexington was decided April 6, 1964.
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largest producer of glass containers with 9.6 percent of the shipment
of that product.64 The majority overturned the district court's65 de-
termination of the relevant product market within which to measure
the effect upon competition.66 The district court found that metal and
glass containers did compete but held they were separate lines of com-
merce; the majority of the Supreme Court concluded that although the
inter-industry overlap between metal and glass containers was not
total, the competitive overlap was great enough to justify treating
them together as a relevant product market.67 Once the two products
were combined into a relevant market, it was a relatively simple
matter for the majority to decide that the merger was "inherently
suspect. ' 68 Further evidence was not required by the majority, who
reasoned that "where concentration is already great," even slight in-
creases in the industry's concentration should be stopped.69
In a dissent written by Justice Harlan in, which Justice Stewart
joined, the existence of the majority's relevant product market was
seriously questioned. The dissent accepted the conclusion of the dis-
trict court that the merger would not "adversely affect competition in
the metal container industry, in the glass container industry, or be-
tween the metal container industry and the glass container industry. 7 0
64. 378 U.S. at 443.
65. 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
66. 378 U.S. at 457-58. The Court rejected the district court's opinion insofar as it
limited the competition protected by section 7 to intra-industry competition. The Court
stated: "Though the 'outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the rea-
sonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product
itself and substitutes for it,' there may be 'within this broad market, well-defined sub-
markets ... which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes."'
Id. at 449.
67. The majority found that "there is and has been a rather general confrontation
between metal and glass containers and competition between them for the same end
uses which is insistent, continuous, effective and quality-wise very substantial." Id. at
453. The Court then held: "[T] he interindustry competition b~tween glass and metal
containers is sufficient to warrant treating as a relevant product market the combined
glass and metal container industries and all end uses for which they compete." Id. at 457
(emphasis added).
68. Id. at 458. The Court went on to point out that the "resulting percentage of the
combined firms approaches that held presumptively bad in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank . I... d. at 461.
69. Id. at 461-62. The Court's holding followed from its analytical approach: "The
merger must be viewed functionally in the context of the particular market involved, its
structure, history and probable future." Id. at 458.
70. Id. at 467. The dissenters accepted the arguments that neither the glass container
industry's willingness to compete with metal containers nor the metal container indus-
try's willingness to compete with glass containers would be reduced, agreeing with the
district court that there was no evidence in either the record or competitive realities that
innovation in either product line would be impaired. Id. at 474-75.
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Concluding that the two industries did not constitute a single line of
commerce threatened by the merger, Justice Harlan pointed out in
support of the acquisition:7'
[T] he Government did not even suggest that such a line of com-
merce existed until it got to this Court. And it does not seriously sug-
gest even now that such a line of commerce exists. The truth is that
"glass and metal containers" form a distinct line of commerce only in
the minds of this Court.
He added:72
Brown Shoe, supra, on which the Court relies for this travesty of
economics . . . spoke of "well-defined submarkets" within a
broader market, and said that the boundaries of such a submarket
were to be determined by "practical indicia"....
Since they perceived no well-defined submarkets, Harlan and Stewart
felt compelled to criticize the majority for applying a market-share
analysis to competition between two separate industries. 73
Justices Harlan and Stewart did not deny that mergers-including
conglomerate mergers 4-could be proscribed when the facts war-
ranted application of section 7 of the Clayton Act to the merger. They
would, however, first require an appropriate determination as to
whether one line or more than one line of commerce is involved.75 If
one line of commerce is involved, the dissenters indicate they might
not oppose use of the structural market share approach to analyze the
anticompetitive impact of the merger.76 If, however, the court finds
71. Id. at 470-71.
72. Id. at 472.
73. Id. at 475. The dissent noted:
The test which the Government advocates is that it "can satisfy its burden of
showing that the merger may have the effect of substantially lessening competition
by proving (a) the existence of substantial competition between two industries; (b)
a high degree of concentration in either or both of the competing industries; and (c)
the dominant position of each of the merging companies in its respective industry."
(Brief, p. 22). This approach, which has at the least the virtue of facing up to its own
logic, frankly disavows attention to a "line of commerce."
Id. at 471 n.6.
74. Id. at 473.
75. The question of the measurement of cross-elasticity of demand as a means to
resolve this kind of factual dispute will be examined later. See text accompanying note
170 infra.
76. 378 U.S. at 475.
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two or more lines of commerce exist, then at least in this situation the
court must make "an inquiry into the competitive effects in the actual
lines of commerce which are involved.177 By emphasizing "effects,"
this approach envisages a performance criterion of evaluation.
IV. ABERRATION: THE PERFORMANCE CRITERION
MINIMIZED
Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC78 was significant in that Justice Stew-
art's dissent focused upon conduct as the determinative criterion. The
majority, too, relied on the conduct criterion as the basis of its deci-
sion; the crux of the disagreement was the extent to which specific
business practices fell within the prohibition of section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.79
The FTC found that Atlantic used both coercion and persuasion to
induce its dealers to sponsor the sale of the tires, batteries and acces-
sories of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Atlantic received a
commission on all sales made by Goodyear to Atlantic's wholesalers
and dealers. Finding that the use of coercion and the use of the
sales-commission plan violated section 5, the FTC enjoined them
both.80 More specifically, the FTC refused even to consider the busi-
ness justification of the sales-commission plan in view of the destruc-
tive effect widespread use of the plan had on commerce.81 The Court
upheld the FTC's power to prohibit the offending plan in its entirety.82
Justices Harlan and Stewart agreed with the majority in upholding
the FTC's power to prohibit Atlantic's use of coercive power to
promote exclusive handling of Goodyear's products by the oil compa-
ny's dealers.83 The key element in their dissent is summarized as fol-
lows:8 4
77. Id.
78. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970), as amended, provides that" [u] nfair methods of competi-
tion in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful." This provision intuitively seems to focus upon the conduct of the
alleged offenders rather than the market structure or performance criteria.
80. 381 U.S. at 359-66.
81. Id. at 371.
82. Id. at 372-73.
83. Id. at 377-79.
84. Id. at 378-79 (emphasis added).
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[G] ranting that the Commission validly found that the petitioners had
engaged in coercive practices amounting to a violation of § 5 of the
Act does not lead me to conclude that its order enjoining the use of
any sales-commission plan of distribution is supportable . . . . [T] o
the extent that the Commission's order is based on the premise that
the sales-commission plan confers upon Atlantic some distinctive ca-
pacity to coerce its dealers into handling sponsored products, and
thereby exclude competing suppliers, it is without foundation.
The sales-commission plan was considered by the dissenters to be
an efficient business practice in that it enabled Atlantic to dispense
with its own storage and distribution facilities which it had been re-
quired to provide under its earlier purchase-resale plan. As viewed by
the dissenters, the sales-commission plan was not the device which
gave Atlantic its power to treat its dealers unfairly; coercion of the
dealers could have occurred "as easily under the sale-commission
plan, the purchase-resale plan, or any plan of distribution which gave
it [Atlantic] a financial interest in the sale of any particular line of
tires, batteries, and accessories." 85 This conclusion led the dissenters
to consider the unique element which gave Atlantic its coercive power:
the disparity of economic power between Atlantic and its distributors
which inevitably resulted from the market structure within which they
found themselves.86 Refusing to believe that section 5 "was intended
to block the expansion of an enterprise into the marketing of...
complementary items,87 the dissenters summarized their position as
follows: 88
All concede that the continuing exclusionary pressure, to the extent
that it exists, derives from the imbalance of economic power between
the two parties, rather than from any unfair feature of the
sales-commission plan. To use an unfair practice charge to punish an
enterprise for consequences inevitably flowing from its position in the
structure of commerce is a grave distortion of the statute, imposing a
massive and unjustifiable restraint on entrepreneurial action ....
85. Id. at 379.
86. The Court had stated: "The disparity in size and financial strength, the short
term of the prevailing leases, the dire financial consequences attendant upon lease can-
cellation, and the established market preference for certain brands of gasoline-all con-
tribute to give Atlantic a leverage over its dealers and a corresponding power to effect
some exclusion of competition." Id. at 380.
87. Id. at 381.
88. Id.
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Justices Harlan and Stewart found the order prohibiting Goodyear's
use of the sales-commission plan especially offensive, observing that if
oil companies who had never coerced their distributors wished to
adopt a sales-commission arrangement with Goodyear, the Court's
decision unwisely precluded the conduct. The dissenters considered
this to be a dubious exercise of the FTC's power.89
The Atlantic case is notable in that, while the two dissenting Jus-
tices found the abusive business practices rooted in the structure of the
industry (the disparity in economic power of the major oil distributor
vis-a-vis its retailers and wholesalers), the limited remedy they
espoused-prohibiting conduct and reprisals-is directed against the
conduct of the offender, rather than the economic situation which fa-
cilitated the abuse of power.9 0
V. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE
PERFORMANCE CRITERION
In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.91 the Court again considered section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. At issue was the alleged mis-
representation and deceptive practice resulting from the undisclosed
use of television mock-ups in a television commercial which allegedly
demonstrated the ability of Colgate's "Rapid Shave" shaving cream to
soften sandpaper for shaving. In fact, a plexiglass model with a sand
coating was softened and shaved in the actual commercial. The ma-
jority held that a material deceptive practice existed if television
viewers were led to believe they were seeing an actual demonstration
when, in fact, the undisclosed use of mock-ups rendered the viewer's
belief untrue.9 2 Moreover, the majority held that any such material
89. Id. at 382. Justice Harlan in FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223, 231 (1968), recanted
on his position, saying: "To the extent that my action in joining today's opinion is in-
consistent with my action in joining my Brother Stewart's dissent in Atlantic Refining
Co. v. FTC .... candor compels me to say that further reflection has convinced me
that the portions of the Commission's order which the Court today sustains were within
the authority granted to the Commission under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act." The Texaco case involved facts nearly identical to Atlantic except that the
arrangement between Texaco and B. F. Goodrich did not evidence overt coercion.
Nonetheless, the FTC order prohibiting the suspect sales-commission plan was rein-
stated, and the plan was held to be "inherently coercive." Id. at 229.
90. 381U.S. at 379.
91. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
92. Id. at 390-92.
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deception, if it induces consumer purchases, can be prohibited under
section 5 "even though the misstatement in no way affects the quali-
ties of the product."93
Justice Harlan joined by Justice Stewart took a position not totally
dissimilar to that which they adopted in the Atlantic case. The dissent
reached the crux of its argument quickly, declaring:94
The only question here is what techniques the advertiser may use to
convey essential truth to the television viewer. If the claim is true and
valid, then the technique for projecting that claim, within broad
boundaries, falls purely within the advertiser's art. The warrant to the
Federal Trade Commission is to police the verity of the claim itself.
The Colgate mock-up, according to this analysis, was not considered
to be deceptive "because what the viewer sees is an accurate image" of
the objective proof. 95 The use of the plexiglass covered with sand was
no more deceptive "than the use of mashed potatoes to convey the
glamorous qualities of a particular ice cream." 96 Finally, the dissent
objected to the breadth of the FTC's order "banning the use of all
mockups" 97 in view of the wide discretion the agency has to create
appropriate remedies. Contending that "the same risk of inaccurate
reproduction inheres in all commercials, '98 the dissenters did not be-
lieve that such a complete prohibition, absent evidence of a pattern of
abuses, could be justified upon the FTC's policing authority. 99
The issue in Colgate was simply how far an individual business
could go in pursuing a specific line of conduct. No structural issues
were apparent, nor was the question of the resulting economic per-
formance considered. The extent to which television advertisers may
go in simulating actual conditions is limited by the inherent compara-
bility of the simulation and actuality, not the potential of the simula-
tion to cause economic inefficiency.
93. Id. at 388.
94. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 397.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 399.
98. Id.
99. Justice Harlan stated: "If the Commission should find that a pattern of misrepre-
sentations by respondents creates a substantial risk that they will not accurately portray
experiments if permitted to continue using mock-ups, the Commission's present order
might well be justified." Id. (emphasis added). The dissenters would have vacated the
judgment and remanded to permit such fact findings.
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The next joint dissent of Justices Harlan and Stewart (authored by
the latter) arose in FTC v. Borden Co.,' 00 a case requiring interpreta-
tion of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robin-
son-Patman Act. 01 The crucial question that confronted the Court
was whether Borden's label was sufficient to differentiate its evapo-
rated milk from the same milk sold under private brand labels, trans-
forming the same basic commodity into products of unlike grade and
quality. If labels could accomplish this differentiation, otherwise
identical milk might be sold to both private-label purchasers and
branded-product purchasers at different prices without violating sec-
tion 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.102
Justice White presented the majority's opinion that the
long-standing FTC interpretation of like grade and quality'0 3 should
be respected. The FTC's position was that while the economic reali-
ties of the marketplace should not be ignored, 04 nevertheless "eco-
nomic factors inherent in brand names and national advertising
should not be considered in the jurisdictional inquiry under the statu-
tory 'like grade and quality' test.' 05 Since Borden admitted that the
milk it packed for private label sellers did not differ physically or
chemically from its own milk, the Court found the two products to be
of like grade and quality. As a result, section 2(a) of the Act con-
100. 383 U.S. 637.(1966).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). The relevant portion of section 2 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases in-
volved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or
the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-,
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them ....
Id. (emphasis added).
102. 383 U.S. at 643-44.
103. Id. at 640. See, e.g., Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 958 (1955); Page Dairy
Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953); United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950); United
States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303
(1938); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936). The Court found the pos-
ition taken in these FTC cases deserved respect on the basis of FTC v. Mandel Bros.,
Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959).
104. 383 U.S. at 645.
105. Id. at 646.
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trolled unless section 2(b) could be successfully invoked by the dis-
criminator to rebut the prima facie case of price discrimination.1 0 6
Justices Harlan and Stewart refused to accept the majority's view
that likeness of grade and quality was simply a matter of physical and
chemical identity. Their view is concisely presented as follows: 107
There is nothing intrinsic to the concepts of grade and quality that
requires exclusion of the commercial attributes of a product from their
definition. The product purchased by a consumer includes not only the
chemical components that any competent laboratory can itemize, but
also a host of commercial intangibles that distinguish the product in
the marketplace. . . . [R]etail purchasers who bought the premium
brand did so with the specific expectation of acquiring a product of
premium quality.
Emphasizing the consumer's willingness to pay a premium for what he
believed to be a premium quality product, the dissenters noted:
"Borden took extensive precautions to insure that a flawed product
did not reach the consumer. None of these precautions was taken for
the private brand milk packed by Borden."'108 Consequently, the mi-
nority concluded that the two products in dispute were not of like
grade and quality, warning that the majority's interpretation would
induce Borden to incorporate minor chemical or physical differences
in its milk to place its product outside the pale of section 2(a). 109
Finally, the dissenters emphasized the commendable results that
flowed from Borden's willingness to pack private label milk. They ob-
served:"l 0
106. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden
of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating
the discrimination: Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall prevent
a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price
or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or
facilities furnished by a competitor.
15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
107. 383 U.S. at 649-50 (footnotes omitted).
108. Id. at 651 (footnotes omitted).
109. Id. at 657.
110. Id. at 660.
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Borden's extensive distribution of its private label brands has intro-
duced significant low-cost competition for Borden's own premium
product. Thus, the large retail chains and cooperative buyer organiza-
tions that are Borden's chief private label customers represent a signif-
icant source of countervailing power to the oligopoly pattern of evapo-
rated milk production.
Quoting Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,"' the dissent warned
"against construction of the Robinson-Patman Act in a manner that
might 'give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with
the purposes of other antitrust legislation.' 1112
This dissent of Justices Harlan and Stewart, unlike those involving
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, did not focus solely
on business conduct. By emphasizing the salutary effects of competi-
tion between Borden and its private-label buyers and the results of
consumer reliance on Borden's carefully maintained product quality,
the dissent extolled the performance of the competitive price system.
In the final analysis it is this performance criterion which prompted
Justices Harlan and Stewart to defend the legality of Borden's practice
under section 2(a).
United States v. Von's Grocery Co." 3 stimulated one of the longest
dissents of Justices Harlan and Stewart. Announced by Justice Stew-
art, the dissent undertook an extensive analysis of the majority's appli-
cation of section 7 of the Clayton Act to prohibit a merger of two
large Los Angeles retail grocery companies. Pointing to a steady de-
cline of small individual retail groceries in the market and the oligopo-
lizing of the market through mergers of market leaders, the majority
held that Von's merger with Shopping Bag Food Stores represented
an indefensible and continuing challenge to many smaller sellers and
thus violated section 7.114
111. 346 U.S. 61(1953).
112. 383 U.S. at 662, quoting Automatic Canteen, 346 U.S. at 63.
113. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
114. Id. at 276-78. The majority relied for its analysis of the structure of the market
on figures showing the concentration of both Von's and Shopping Bag, and the decline of
small single owner stores. From 1948 to 1958 Von's increased its stores in the Los An-
geles area from fourteen to twenty-seven, and during the same period, Shopping Bag
increased from fifteen to thirty-four. Id. at 272. The accompanying jumps in shares of
the market were double for Von's and triple for Shopping Bag. Combined, the two-store
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Two standards were cited by the dissent as governing application of
section 7 to the Von's-Shopping Bag merger: "the contemporary eco-
nomic context of the industry" and "the purpose of Section 7 to pro-
tect competition, not to protect competitors . ".".."115 Turning first to
the contemporary economic milieu of the merger, Justices Harlan and
Stewart faulted the majority's analysis as a "simple exercise in sums"
which enhanced "the theory that the degree of competition is invari-
ably proportional to the number of competitors." ' 1 6 While the dissent-
ers did not contest the twenty-nine percent decline in single-store gro-
cery firms in an eleven-year period, they did not find vigorous local
competition to have declined as a result. 1 7 The dissent attributed the
decline in small competitors to "transcending social and technological
changes," caused by forces other than the present merger.1l 8
Analyzing the trend toward concentration in the market, the dissent
noted that turnover among the top twenty firms in the Los Angeles
market was very high 19 and that entry of new multistore firms had
been common. 120 The fantastic growth of chain stores from successful
one-store operations resulted in great competition among the chains,
chain represented the second largest market share in the Los Angeles area. However,
that combined market share was only 7.5%. Id.
The number of owners operating single grocery stores in the Los Angeles area had
fallen from 5,635 in 1950 to 3,818 in 1961; and by 1963, to 3,590--after three years of
activity by the combined forces. Id. at 273.
The majority further relied on figures showing increased oligopolization of the
market. For example, from 1949 to 1958, nine of the top twenty firms acquired 126
stores from their smaller competitors. Id.
115. Id. at 282. To buttress its view on the protection of competition, the dissent
quoted Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 294, 320 (1962): "Taken as a whole,
the legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competi-
tion, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such
combinations may tend to lessen competition."
116. 384 U.S. at 282.
117. Id.at286-87.
118. Id. at 288. Justices Harlan and Stewart observed:
Section 7 was never intended by Congress as a charter to roll back the supermarket
revolution. Yet the Court's opinion is hardly more than a requiem for the so called
"Mom and Pop" grocery stores . . . that are now obsolete in many parts of the
country. No action by this Court can resurrect the old single-line Los Angeles food
stores that have been run over by the automobile or obliterated by the freeway.
Id.
119. Id. at 290. For a discussion of the significance of turnover among oligopolistic
firms see Shepherd, On Appraising Evidence About Market Power, 12 ANTITRusT BULL.
65 (1967); Gort, Analysis of Stability and Change in Market Shares, 71 J. OF POL. EcON.
51-61 (1963).
120. During the period from 1953-1962, 173 new chain stores appeared in the
market area, and during the same period 119 chain stores went out of business. 384 U.S.
at 291.
578
Vol. 48: 555, 1973
Antitrust Dissents of Justices Harlan and Stewart
so that even accepting the decline in individual grocery stores, compe-
tition in the market as a whole increased.
Further, the dissent argued that this was really a market-extension
merger, a rather innocuous type of merger, based on both geograph-
ical dispersion between the stores of Von's and Shopping Bag and the
shopping habits of buyers. Normal marketing practices suggested that
a major portion (over one-half) of the merged stores were geographi-
cally noncompetitive. Since it found the merger was "three parti
market extension and only one part horizontal,"''1 the dissenters con-
cluded that the elimination of Shopping Bag as an independent com-
petitor foreclosed only one percent of the total sales in the market,' 22
a minimal increment in market share not considered to constitute a
significant increase in market power. Not only did competition result
from the growth of chain stores, but substantial competition from
single-store firms existed as well. Despite the decrease in the number
of small firms, the growth of cooperative buying organizations gave
these small firms a greater basis for competition with the chains.
Summation of these factors led the dissent to reject the majority's
condemnation of the merger. The dissent substantiated its theory by
observing that although the merged entity had been functioning for
four years, "the District Court found not a shred of evidence that
competition had been in any way impaired by the merger.' 23
Thus Justices Harlan and Stewart applied a combined structure-
performance criteria to the unique aspects of the Los Angeles gro-
cery industry, primarily emphasizing performance. Practically no
emphasis was placed on conduct of the new firm. Recognizing the
obvious continuing competition in the market despite the merger, the
dissenters bitterly concluded that "in litigation under Section 7, the
Government always wins."'124
In 1967, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.125 evoked a par-
tial dissent and concurrence by Justices Harlan and Stewart. 26 At
121. Id.at 296.
122. The figure of one percent was arrived at by multiplying the overlap (25%)
by the market share possessed by Shopping Bag before the merger (4.2%).
123. 384U.S. at 299-301.
124. Id. at 301.
125. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
126. Justice Stewart authored the dissent. In a companion case, United States v.
Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967), Justice Harlan alone dissented.
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issue in Schwinn was whether Schwinn's bicycle distribution plan con-
stituted an unreasonable restraint of trade prohibited by section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Schwinn's sales were basically of three types: (1)
sales directly to franchised distributors, (2) sales to franchised dealers
under agency or consignment arrangements, and (3) sales under the
so-called Schwinn plan. Under the Schwinn plan, Schwinn shipped
merchandise directly to franchised dealers, while extending credit to
the retailer and paying him a commission on sales. In states allowing
fair-trade pricing, Schwinn fair-traded its bicycles.' 27
By agreement with its franchised distributors and retailers, Schwinn
imposed a series of restrictions that stimulated the government chal-
lenge. Distributors and retailers alike were restricted both to sales in a
fixed territory (so called vertical territorial restrictions) and to sales to
specific classes of customers--distributors could sell only to the fran-
chised retailers, and the retailers in turn could sell only to consumers
(not to unfranchised retailers). The Government attacked all of these
restrictions as "restraints of trade."
Although the District Court held only that the territorial restrictions
on distributors were illegal, the majority extended this conclusion by
holding that all the restrictions were illegal if imposed in connection
with an absolute sale by Schwinn. However, the majority further con-
cluded that the agency and consignment plan as well as the Schwinn
plan were not unreasonable restraints of trade, holding that as long as
Schwinn retained "title, dominion, and risk" 128 and the dealers were
de facto agents or salesmen, Schwinn's franchising arrangements did
not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. 129
To the extent that the majority upheld Schwinn's agency, consign-
ment, and Schwinn-plan arrangement, Justices Harlan and Stewart
agreed. But they did not agree that the part of the distribution ar-
rangement involving absolute sales was a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' 3 0
True to form, Justices Harlan and Stewart were concerned with the
underlying social and economic functioning of the franchise system
employed by Schwinn. Noting that the reasons for Schwinn's shift to
127. 388 U.S. at 369-70.
128. Id. at 380.
129. Id.at381.
130. Id. at 382.
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the distribution method in question were to eliminate wastefulness
caused by a huge excess of retailers and to ensure that the ultimate
sales to the public would be made to the public by qualified retailers,
the dissent observed that the franchise system effectively placed the
small business franchisee in an exclusive and favorable position, thus
stimulating increased competition and preventing the balance of dis-
tribution from becoming too vertical.131 Relying upon these social and
economic justifications, the dissent approved the distribution plan in
its entirety.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding regarding the
absolute sales distribution plan on two legal grounds: (1) such a result
runs directly contrary to the prior case law,132 and (2) the ancient rule
prohibiting restraints on alienation is outmoded in light of today's
market structure. The dissent stated that the distinction between sales
and agency-consignment arrangements was one of form, not of sub-
stance, concluding that the majority had created "a bluntly indiscrimi-
nate and destructive weapon which can be used to dismantle a vast
variety of distributional systems-competitive and anticompetitive,
reasonable and unreasonable."' 33 Rather than focusing on this purely
formal distinction, the majority should have been more concerned
with the basic structure of Schwinn's program.
Consistent with the position they adopted in their earlier dissents,
Justices Harlan and Stewart reasoned that in contemporary circum-
stances it was important to allow business to adopt practices which
would facilitate competition because salutary social and economic ef-
fects flow from a competitive structure. In short, if competitive results
were assumed to be beneficial, those structural arrangements which
facilitated competition should not be too casually struck down.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., d.b.a. Democrat Publishing Co.'34 pro-
duced a dissent by both Justices Harlan and Stewart. 135 At issue was
the Globe-Democrat's distribution policy of restricting its wholesalers
to a specified exclusive territory and fixing the maximum price for
resale by the wholesalers. Albrecht, the petitioner, was one of the
131. Id. at 384-85.
132. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
133. 388 U.S. at 394.
134. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
135. Justice Harlan also concurred in Justice Stewart's dissent.
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wholesalers. Since he refused to sell the papers for prices within the
fixed maximum, the Globe-Democrat after repeated warnings to him,
undertook delivery of the paper to customers in Albrecht's territory at
the lower prescribed price. After securing approximately twenty-five
percent of Albrecht's circulation by solicitations made in part through
a sales agency, the paper granted a dealership to another distributor
who adhered to the fixed price. When the Globe-Democrat made Al-
brecht an offer to return the route conditioned upon his adhering to
the fixed price, Albrecht refused and instituted a treble damage com-
plaint alleging violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 13 6
Basing its opinion on United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,' 37 the
majority held that the Globe-Democrat's suggested maximum pricing
was not merely a unilateral act but rather was a combination between
the Globe-Democrat, the sales agency and the new distributor within
the meaning of the Sherman Act. 138 After reaching this conclusion,
the majority proceeded to equate fixing of maximum prices with fixing
of minimum prices, and hence condemned the price-fixing scheme as
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.139
The joint dissent of Justices Harlan and Stewart contended that the
purpose of the Globe-Democrat's maximum price "was in furtherance
of . . . the purpose of the antitrust laws.' 40 Since in the dissenter's
136. 390 U.S. at 147-48.
137. 362 U.S. 90(1960).
138. In Parke, Davis, that company had set suggested resale prices for both whole-
sale distributors and dealers. The Albrecht Court analyzed Parke, Davis as finding that
forced compliance of both wholesalers and dealers amounted to a combination; a com-
bination with the retailers existed because their acquiescence in the suggested prices was
forced by threats, and a combination with wholesalers was found because they cooper-
ated in terminating price-cutting retailers. Observing that even this forced union consti-
tuted a combination, the Court in Albrecht argued that the association between the
Globe-Democrat, the sales agency, and the new distributor was much more voluntary
and thus a more certain combination.
139. 390 U.S. at 151-53. The majority placed heavy reliance on Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), which struck down a maximum
pricing agreement as violative of the Sherman Act. Justice Harlan in his separate dissent
took issue with the majority's use of the Kiefer-Stewart decision, arguing that Kief-
er-Stewart was not a blanket holding that suggested retail prices by a manufacturer al-
ways produce a combination in restraint of trade, but rather was a case involving an
agreement by two manufacturers to impose on retailers "a condition of doing business
which they might not have been able to demand individually." 390 U.S. at 164-65. Jus-
tice Harlan further stated that even if a combination were found, the fixing of maximum
prices simply should not invoke the per se theory, since the technique can be a reason-
able method of preventing unscrupulous retailers from driving up the prices in their ex-
clusive territories. Id. at 165-68.
140. Id. at 168.
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eyes Albrecht was a monopolist in his exclusive territory, the regulated
maximum price protected the consumer from monopoly pricing. This
conclusion was summarized succinctly: "To the extent that [the
Globe-Democrat] prevented [Albrecht] from raising his price above
that which would have prevailed in a competitive market, [the
Globe-Democrat's] actions were fully compatible with the antitrust
laws."'141 According to the dissent, the majority's decision caused a
system which assured a competitive price to be stricken under a
statute supposedly protective of competition. Believing the antitrust
law's purpose to be greatly subverted, the dissent summarily re-
marked: "The Court in this case does more, I think, than simply de-
part from the rule of reason .... The Court today stands the Sherman
Act on its head.1 42
In Albrecht the result-oriented performance criterion clearly domi-
nated the concern of the two dissenters.' 43 Although the conduct of
the business was closely allied with the resulting performance, it was
the desirable protection of the consumer from potentially noncompeti-
tive prices which, in the eyes of Justices Harlan and Stewart, immu-
nized the behavior of the Globe-Democrat from the Sherman Act at-
tack launched by Albrecht.
The Robinson-Patman Act elicited another brief but pointed dissent
in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co,'4 4 a case involving the in-
tensely competitive frozen pie industry in and around the Salt Lake
City area. To counterbalance the natural location advantage and con-
sequent lower sales price of Utah Pie, its competitors drastically
slashed prices on their products in the Salt Lake area, 145 while at the
same time maintaining higher prices for sales of the same product
elsewhere. This action forced Utah Pie to lower its prices to a drasti-
cally low level. However, there was evidence that in spite of the reduc-
tion Utah Pie's sales volume and profits increased during the period of
the price war.
141. Id. at 169 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 170 (footnotes omitted).
143. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 156-57 (Justice Harlan dissenting). The central thesis
of his analysis reinforces Justice Stewart's position-the basic underlying economic
considerations arising from fixing price maxima are unlike those of fixing price minima.
If economic facts ever justify price maxima, Justice Harlan felt that this case presented
such a situation.
144. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
145. Id. at 689-91.
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Utah Pie brought suit against its competitors alleging a violation of
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price dis-
crimination the effect of which is: "substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who eithers grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination."'1 46 The ma-
jority first held that setting different prices for the same product was
price discrimination, 147 and then reversed the district court's holding
that the price discrimination did not lessen competition, finding it was
a jury question whether: (1) Utah Pie's performance was potentially
impaired because it was forced to reduce its prices drastically to meet
the declining market price; and whether (2) other, smaller competitors
sustained injury as a result of the price war.' 48
The brief dissent of Justices Harlan and Stewart, authored by Jus-
tice Stewart, challenged the majority on the one essential point of
whether the price discrimination substantially lessened competition.
One factor convinced them that competition had been preserved-the
near monopoly share (66.5%) of Utah had been reduced to 45.3%.
As a result, the dissenters concluded that the market as of 1961 had to
be even more competitive than before-the price discrimination ac-
tually had a beneficial effect on the market, because lower prices, said
the dissent, are the hallmark of intensified competition. 49
As in other cases, Justices Harlan and Stewart relied on the per-
formance emanating from a structure they found workably competi-
tive. If competitive results were forthcoming, legal intervention was
not requred under the statute as the two Justices interpreted it.
VI. THE NATURAL GAS CASES
The last antitrust dissents the two Justices fashioned prior to Justice
Harlan's resignation on September 23, 1971, arose in the second and
third of the three cases involving the El Paso Natural Gas Com-
146. For section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, see note 101 supra.
147. 386 U.S. at 702.
148. The majority noted in this context that in 1960 there were nine other competi-
tors in the market who maintained 12.7% of the market, while in 1961 there were
only eight other sellers who maintained 8.2% of the market. Id. at 700.
149. Id. at 706.
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pany.150 The controversy originated when El Paso Natural Gas Co. ac-
quired the stock and assets of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. The
majority found that the acquisition constituted a violation of section 7
of the Clayton Act and ordered divestiture. Justices Harlan and
Stewart agreed with the majority that the acquisition was a violation,
but Justice Harlan believed the Court should allow the district court
to draft a remedy.
Three years later during the divestiture of Pacific Northwest by El
Paso, concerned parties (the State of California, Southern California
Edison Company, and Cascade Natural Gas) attempted to intervene
in the proceedings. 151 Alleging that they might be adversely affected
by the disposition proposed, the appellants unsuccessfully argued for
the right to intervene in district court divestiture proceedings which ul-
timately required El Paso to create a new company to receive the as-
sets of Pacific Northwest. The companies contended that the lower
court divestiture decree failed to create a competitive pipeline in ac-
cordance with the Supreme Court's earlier mandate and appealed the
district court's denial of the right to intervene.1 52 The Supreme Court
reversed the district court and allowed the three companies to inter-
vene,' 53 ordering a reopening of the case on its merits.154 It then pre-
sented guidelines for the decree155 and ordered that on remand a dis-
trict judge "different from the one who heard the case before" be as-
signed.156
150. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969);
Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
151. The interest of the State of California was to ensure that competition would be
restored in California. Previously, Pacific Northwest had been a substantial figure in the
market. Southern California Edison was a large industrial user of natural gas which
purchased large quantities of gas from El Paso in California and desired to preserve the
competition in California. Cascade Natural Gas was an Oregon distributor whose
prime source of gas was Pacific Northwest before the merger. Since Cascade would be
supplied by New Company after divestiture, Cascade was interested in ensuring that
New Company was a strong competitor. 386 U.S. at 132-33.
152. 376 U.S. at 664.
153. 386 U.S. at 133. The Court relied on the provision in Rule 24(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure which allowed intervention as a matter of right when:
"the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by... disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(3) (1966). The
Court held that this section allowed both the State of California and Southern Cali-
fornia Edison to intervene.
154. 386U.S. at 135-36.
155. Id. at 136-42.
156. Id. at 142-43.
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The basic argument of Justices Harlan and Stewart (who authored
the dissent) is that no right to intervene existed. After an historical
analysis of the type of interest that could support intervention, the dis-
sent stated: 157
These general and indefinite interests do not even remotely resemble
the direct and concrete stake in litigation required for intervention of
right. The Court's decision not only overturns established general
principles of intervention, but . . . also repudiates a large and
long-established body of decisions specifically, and correctly, denying
intervention in government antitrust litigation.
The dissenters reasoned that to allow intervention would prolong and
confuse an already protracted case and would allow a private party to
press suit with the government when a separate procedure had been
established for private suits. Further, Stewart contended that the
United States should be the only party allowed to assert the "public
interest" in antitrust litigation. For these reasons, the dissent believed
that the tactical decision of the Department of Justice in accepting the
divestiture decree of the lower court should be supported. The extent
of judicial interference and the creation of new legal rights simply
overwhelmed the two Justices; their own predilections would not allow
the activist reconstruction of the structure of the natural gas market
that the majority proposed.
The script became more hectic when the State of Utah questioned
whether the new decree of the district court 58 conformed to the
guidelines mandated by the Supreme Court in Cascade Natural Gas Co.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the second case. Although the district
court's decree provided that Colorado Interstate Gas Corporation
should assist New Company in becoming an effective competitor, an
extensive corporate interlock between El Paso and New Company
would remain. Subsequently Utah, along with twenty-one other parties,
moved to dismiss their own proposed appeal. 159
157. Id. at 147. Two of the decisions in which the courts have denied intervention
are: Illinois v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 375 U.S. 834 (1963); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1963). See also cases
cited in Cascade, 386 U.S. at 148 n.j 1.
158. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. & Pac. N.W. Pipeline Corp., 291 F.
Supp. 3 (D. Utah 1968).
159. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464, 466-69
(1969).
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The majority, however, decided that even though the appellants
had moved to dismiss their appeal, the Court could retain jurisdiction
to determine whether its guidelines governing the divestiture had been
complied with.160 The Court decided that the divestiture did not com-
ply,161 both because the distribution of gas reserves was unsatisfac-
tory 62 and because all financial and managerial interconnections
between El Paso and New Company had not been effectively
severed.' 63
The dissent of Justice Harlan in which Justice Stewart joined was
almost predictable. It stated first that the Court's decision was "precip-
itate" because there had been no oral argument and no "full" briefs
filed on the question. Then it argued that on a procedural basis, the
appellant had an absolute right to dismiss its own appeal. Finally, the
dissent believed that the controls on El Paso allowed sufficient separa-
tion of the two companies and that the allocation of all reserves was
sufficient for establishing New Company. 64 As a parting considera-
tion, the dissent noted that what the Court had done did not "even
promise to further the interests of California's gas consumers."'1 65 Jus-
tices Harlan and Stewart thought it unwise to reform the structure of
the industry when performance was not likely to improve as a result of
the structural change.
160. Id. at 466-69.
161. Id. at 469.
162. Id. at 464-71. The majority held that the district court erred in giving New
Company only 21.8% of the San Juan Basin reserves, concluding that the decree
should have specified enough reserves- so that New Company could meet the Pacific
Northwest's existing requirements.
163. Id. at 471-72. El Paso was allowed to retain five million shares of New Compa-
ny's nonvoting preferred stock. This resulted in a relationship that was contrary to the
majority's order of complete divestiture.
164. The dissent noted the controls that had been adopted to remedy the defects the
majority had found in Cascade. The dissent summarized the decree as follows:
No members of the immediate family of any officer, director, or owner of one-half
of one percent of El Paso shares may convert their non-voting preference shares
into voting common shares at any time. Moreover, any person who acts in concert
with any director, officer, or substantial owner of El Paso is included within the
ban. In addition, these same individuals are not permitted to obtain control of sig-
nificant proportions of CIG stock, thereby achieving control over the New Com-
pany indirectly. Officers, directors, and their associates are barred from owning
more than one-tenth of one percent of CIG stock during the next 10 years and sub-
stantial owners of El Paso may not own more than 5% of the outstanding com-
mon stock of CIG.
Id. at 483-84.
165. Id. at 485.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
What does this review of selected antitrust dissents of Justices
Harlan and Stewart reveal? Is there an important rationale underlying
their nay-saying that provides insights on future directions the Court
may take? If so, will the contours of the American economy reflect
these directions?
Basic to an appreciation of what these two Justices have attempted
to do is a recognition of their general acceptance of a central eco-
nomic orientation. They have quite clearly embraced two evaluative
concepts. First is their ready and nearly uniform reliance on a crite-
rion of performance, albeit not completely divorced from structural
considerations, in determining what business may or may not legally
do. This reliance, most clearly revealed in Von's, Utah Pie and Con-
tinental Can, implicitly accepts the main features of the competitive
economic model-the destruction of inefficient firms under the pressure
of social and economic technology providing lower prices to the
consumer, and the maintenance of innovation which it is assumed also
redounds to the consumer's benefit while not significantly increasing
oligopolization of the economy. Second, the Justices' attitude toward
structural change is a nonactivist one. Thus, the two seem to oppose
Court action designed to change the concentration patterns emerging
from acquisitions and mergers so long as the results delivered to the
consumers are not considered to be deteriorating. Clearly revealing this
pattern are the dissents in Philadelphia, Alcoa-Rome Cable, Von's
and Albrecht. Seldom "never" is too strong, as indicated by Col-
gate-Palmolive--does business conduct become the central evaluative
criterion. Even in a rare case such as Atlantic where conduct is given
serious consideration by Justices Harlan and Stewart, they formulate
the criterion in terms of asking not whether the conduct is illegal per
se, but whether the consumer benefits or is injured as a result of the
conduct.
A basic philosophical conflict underlies the essentially nonactivist
stance taken by the dissenters. Their view is in marked contrast to the
activist position taken by consumer interest advocates such as Ralph
Nader's study team 166 and former Senator Fred Harris, whose pro-
166. See M. GREEN, B. MOORE, JR. & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE
SYSTEM (1972).
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posal for a "Concentrated Industries Act,' 167 asserts that satisfactory
economic performance can be realized only if the structure of the
American economy is fundamentally reconstituted. Justices Harlan
and Stewart opt for a retention of the structure that emerges from the
day-to-day operations of the system. It is a system that could be consid-
ered "workably competitive" in the sense in which Professor John M.
Clark developed that term.168 Professor Clark recognized that in the
application of the antitrust laws, the highly theoretical prerequisite of
a perfect atomistic competitive structure with product homogeneity
could not exist. Instead he opted for a kind of competition which he
described as:169
rivalry in selling goods, in which each selling unit normally seeks max-
imum net revenue, under conditions such that the price or prices each
seller can charge are effectively limited by the free option of the buyer
to buy from a rival seller or sellers of what we think of as "the same"
product, necessitating an effort by each seller to equal or exceed the
attractiveness of the others' offerings to a sufficient number of sellers
[sic] to accomplish the end in view.
Generally a particular structure is not illegal per se to adherents of
this position; the test is whether or not the performance of the struc-
ture is salutary.
The bases upon which the two dissenters acted are often as shaky as
the foundation which they ascribe to the majority. Thus, in cases aris-
ing under section 7 of the Clayton Act (e.g., Alcoa-Rome and Conti-
nental Can), they argue against the market boundaries adopted by the
majority in finding concentration which threatens competition. Yet no
matter how incisive their insistence that the majority creates new in-
dustrial lines, their own analysis is essentially impressionistic. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that measures of cross-elasticity of demand, no
matter how burdensome the practical difficulties of computation,
might be revealing of industry boundaries. 7 0 Measures of cross-elas-
167. S. 2614, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
168. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241
(1940) and Sosnick, A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition, 72 QUARTERLY
J. OF ECON. 380 (1958).
169. Clark, supra note 168, at 234. Obviously the author meant "buyers" instead
of "sellers" in the closing words of this quote. See also Sosnick, supra note 168.
170. For a discussion of the application of cross-elasticity of demand in this context,
see G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PeIce 88-90, 219-21, 280-85 (1947).
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ticity may provide a basis upon which future analysis may proceed to
render arguments less impressionistic.
There is another dimension to the dissents of Justices Harlan and
Stewart: their strict constructionist conservatism. In interpreting stat-
utes and applying them to specific cases, the two Justices adopt literal
interpretations of the language of the act and the intent of the Con-
gress. Indicative of this view are the decisions involving bank acquisi-
tions and mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Bank
Merger Act of 1960 as revealed in Philadelphia. The strict construc-
tionist compass of their decisions is also disclosed by the reiteration of
their position that under the Robinson-Patman Act protection of
competitors and protection of competition may not be consistent.
Economic theory accepts the basic premise that competition as a
process requires the demise of individual competitors who cannot
remain operationally viable. If this premise is accepted and if "work-
able competition" as defined by Clark 171 is adopted as a goal, it is log-
ical to interpret the antitrust statutes conservatively, thereby tolerating
structural rigidities and behavior that might otherwise be condemned.
In a similar vein it may be noted that Justices Harlan and Stewart
appear to be judicial strict constructionists. Hence they can speak
comfortably of adherence to centuries of tradition and to past judicial
construction of the rules of intervention in the El Paso Natural Gas
cases. Whether the issue is statutory or judicial construction, Justices
Harlan and Stewart emerge generally conservative in their approach.
Why does all this matter? The answer is that if, as seems probable,
the appointments of Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist foreshadow a reorientation of the Court toward a more
conservative position, the orientation of antitrust policies may follow
the contours traced by the dissents examined here. The position of
Justice Stewart as a senior member of the Court may reinforce this
possibility. In that likely event, the Court's antitrust policies may be-
come less and less structurally directed and progressively more in-
clined to emphasize the economic performance of the industry. If these
projections prove tenable, credence will be given to the famous words
of Justice Cardozo:172
171. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
172. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 14 YALE REVIEW 699 (1925).
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The spokesman of the Court is cautious, timid, fearful of the vivid
word, the heightened phrase. He dreams of an unworthy brook of
scions, the spawn of careless dicta, disowned by the ratio decidendi.
. . . The result is to cramp and paralyze. One fears to say anything
when the peril of misunderstanding puts a warning finger to the lips.
Not so, however, the dissenter. . . . Deep conviction and warm
feeling are saying their last say with knowledge that the cause is lost.
. . . The dissenter speaks to the future, and his -voice is pitched to a
key that will carry through the years.
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